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ABSTRACT: Many French-speaking approaches to argumentation are deeply rooted in a linguistic 
background. Hence, they "naturally" tend to adopt a descriptive stance on argumentation. This is the 
reason why the issue of "the virtues of argumentation" – and, specifically, the question of what makes 
an argument virtuous – is not central to them. The argumentative norms issue nevertheless cannot 
be discarded, as it obviously is crucial to arguers themselves: the latter often behave as if they were 
invested with some kind of argumentative policing duty when involved in dissensual exchanges. We 
propose to account for a number of researches developing a descriptive approach to such an 
ordinary argumentative police: we claim that the virtues of argumentation may be an issue even for 
an amoral analyst. We will connect this issue with linguistic remarks on the lexicon of refutation in 
English and in French. 
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1. NORMATIVE VERSUS DESCRIPTIVE PERSPECTIVE 
 
In some way, the research orientation presented is this paper is quite representative 
of a trend in French-speaking argumentation studies – even if the phrase "a trend in 
French-speaking argumentation studies" sounds a little bit too ambitious for the 
reality it refers to.1  
The approaches I am referring to are descriptive; they aim at analyzing the 
discursive and interactional mechanisms involved in argumentative discussions, but 
they are little – if at all – committed in assessing the argumentative devices thus 
identified.  
This preference for a descriptive stance on argumentation is characteristic of 
scholars in argumentation studies originating from the field of linguistics, rhetoric, 
or from that of French discourse analysis (Amossy, 2009, 2012). Such scholars by 
and large adhere to Plantin’s claim according to whom there is nothing like a 
linguistic marker of the truth or soundness of a discourse, any more than there are 
markers of proper or beautiful discourse: "Il n’y a pas plus de marqueur linguistique 
                                                 
1 I prefer "French-speaking approaches" to "French approaches" insofar as the researches I am 
referring to are developed in France, but also in Belgium, in Switzerland, or in Israel; the number of 
French-speaking scholars the research of whom is essentially focused on argumentation may be 




du discours vrai que de marqueurs linguistiques du bon ou du beau discours", 
writes Plantin (2002, p. 237).  
Beyond contrasting disciplinary anchorages, there also may be deeper 
cultural reasons for this theoretical divide of argumentation studies into normative 
versus descriptive approaches. 
This cultural hypothesis may be supported by an observation I made when 
beginning to work on my paper for the 2013 OSSA conference on "The virtues of 
Argumentation". 
 
2. "VIRTUOUS ARGUMENT"  "ARGUMENT VERTUEUX" 
 
As any conscientious participant to the 10th OSSA conference, my first concern when 
preparing my talk was to fit its theme, "Virtues of argumentation". It did not seem 
obvious to me how the phrase "Virtues of argumentation" should be understood. As 
a result of linguistic scruples due to my non-native speaker status, I took the title 
"Virtues of argumentation" not in the general sense of "the benefits that one can 
expect from the practice of argumentation", but in the restricted sense of "what 
makes an argument virtuous". Even understood that way, I still had to face a 
hesitation which was due partly to a conceptual uncertainty, and partly to a feeling 
of linguistic insecurity: does the phrase "the virtues of argumentation" mean the 
same thing as French "les vertus de l’argumentation"? The way I proceeded to 
handle this question was to turn to a Google search to have a look at the uses of the 
phrases "virtuous argument" and "argument vertueux" in context. What came out 
was a spectacular divergence between the uses of the French phrase "argument 
vertueux" and that of the English corresponding phrase "virtuous argument". 
As a result of this Google search, the phrase "virtuous argument" seems to 
appear in casual contexts as well as in scientific settings. It is used by ordinary 
speakers (if anything such as an ordinary speaker ever exists) as well as by experts, 
or semi-experts, in rhetoric or argumentation studies. The following semantic 
considerations are drawn from the instances found on the Internet.2 
The meaning which is associated to the phrase "virtuous argument" is by and 
large stable. It refers to an argument that is acceptable,3 from a moral point of view, 
but also in a much broader sense. A "virtuous argument" is ethical in the sense that 
it is grounded in virtues such as sincerity, honesty, and accountability (through the 
support-giving requirement attached to it). It is respectful of the opponent and of 
the audience and shows open-mindedness, tolerance and generosity, for it requires 
the arguer to consider alternative points of view.4 A "virtuous argument" also 
complies with the rules which warrant the validity of an argument. If favors the 
respect of principles rather than the achievement of persuasive objectives. A 
                                                 
2 The footnote references to specific texts found on the Internet are meant to illustrate the meaning 






"virtuous argument" is "faithful to the ideals" of the speakers,5 at the risk of 
unrealism,6 it is based on the speaker’s humanity, or on "righteous reasons".7 It may 
be inspired by religion,8 as well as by mundane principles. 
"Virtuous argument" is opposed to "vicious argument", that is, an argument 
which is deemed purely instrumental, for which the end justifies the means; a 
vicious argument is "interest driven".9 Non-virtuous arguments may be "vile," 
"misogynistic" and "repulsive"; they pertain toxic rhetoric.10 
These are the main semantic elements resulting from a survey of the results 
of a Google search with the phrase "virtuous argument" as a keyword. 
By contrast, the French expression "argument vertueux" turns out to be almost 
always used in a distanced and even anti-phrastic, ironic way. Example 1 is typical of 
such a use of "argument vertueux". It is drawn from the website of the French 
newspaper Le Figaro, and it announces that in England the 3D technology is being 
used to broadcast operas such as Carmen or Lucrezia Borgia in selected cinemas or 
on TV channels. The comment by the author of the paper on the communication 
surrounding this innovation runs as follows:  
 
Example (1) 
Pour camoufler le caractère lucratif de la démarche (qui n’a rien de 
choquant, au contraire), on nous ressert le même argument vertueux : 
encourager ceux qui, terrorisés, n’ont jamais mis les pieds dans une salle 
d’opéra, à franchir le pas.11 
In order to conceal the lucrative dimension of the project (whereas it 
is by no way shocking, on the contrary), we are served up again the 
same virtuous argument: it is a way of encouraging those who, 
terrified, have never set foot in an opera hall to make the leap.  
 
In this example, the expression "virtuous argument" paradoxically refers to an 
argument which is subject to a negative assessment – it is paradoxical, since 
"virtuous" is linguistically endowed with a positive assessment. The way the 
"virtuous argument" is introduced in this example ("we are served up again the 
same virtuous argument") views it as a well-worn, poorly conclusive argument. 
Besides, the so-called "virtuous argument" is deceptive, in that it is intended to 
                                                 




7  David MacGarty,David Nott (eds), Disaster Medicine. A case-based approach. http://books.google.fr 
8 The morality of Shakespeare’s Drama illustrated by Mrs Griffith. http://books.google.fr ; Lawrence J. 
Friedman, Gregarious Saints: Self and Community in Antebellum American Abolitionism, 1830-1870. 
http://books.google.fr 






conceal the real motives of the speaker, which have to do with financial issues. Thus, 
despite the clearly negative assessment attached to the phrasing of the argument, 
the adjective "virtuous" is used, which clearly has a positive orientation. This 
antiphrastic use of "virtuous" serves the denunciation of an ethotic strategy led by 
the speaker: the argument put forward to support the 3D broadcast of operas is 
used for its consensus-generating potential and its ethotic dimension. It makes the 
arguer appear anxious to provide culturally deprived people with an access to high-
valued cultural goods. In that, it promotes a well-wishing, solidarity-oriented 
attitude that can meet nothing but agreement – one can hardly oppose the use of 3D 
broadcast of operas claiming that opera is, and should remain, restricted to an elite 
sophisticated enough to appreciate it at its real value. The so-called virtuous 
argument is thus discarded as purely strategic and insincere. 
I will confine myself to this example to illustrate the use of the French 
expression ‘argument vertueux’ that seems to prevail, but it is far from being an 
isolated atypical example. 
To sum up the certainly too hasty impressions conveyed by this cursory 
investigation of the "virtuous argument" / ‘argument vertueux’ phrases, it seems 
that in an Anglo-American context, people have no problem with qualifying an 
argument as virtuous, based on a set of backing principles or values which can be 
made more or less explicit. In contrast, in a French-speaking context, an argument 
can hardly be thought of as genuinely virtuous, without seeing in the displayed 
virtue a mere strategy aiming at prompting consensus on the thesis under 
discussion, and at attracting sympathy onto the arguer: a virtuous argument is a 
façade argument used to make the arguer himself appear virtuous. 
 
3. ARISTOTLE’S LOGICS / ARISTOTLE’S RHETORICS 
 
This contrasting approach to "virtuous argument" may be connected with 
contrasting traditions in argumentation studies. Most of the scholars the research of 
whom is rooted in Aristotle’s Dialectics and Logics are English-speaking (whether 
they are native speakers or not, their research is mainly conducted in English). They 
develop an approach that handles arguments as sets of propositions structured 
along identifiable logical patterns. The evaluation of arguments requires that, 
beyond the identification of the logical pattern they show, further parameters be 
taken into account; these additional parameters allow to handle characteristics of 
the context (Blair, 2004) or interactional specifications.  
In contrast, most of French-speaking approaches to argumentation – and in 
particular, the approach I myself develop –come under two traditions. First, as 
mentioned before, some of them adopt a linguistic perspective. They may consider 
argumentative discourse as characterized by a specific regime of transphrastic 
coherence and come under a textual linguistics approach (here I thing mainly of 
Jean-Michel Adam’s work on argumentation ; cf. Adam, 2004);12 some others, mainly 
inspired by Oswald Ducrot’s research, claim that argumentative meaning is 
                                                 




constrained by the linguistic system (Ducrot, 1995; Anscombre & Ducrot, 1983; 
Carel, 2010). Typically, such a linguistic perspective on argumentation focuses on 
the way the use of argumentative connectors or the choice of lexical items prepares 
an utterance to support some conclusions over others by selecting specific semantic 
topoï. Such a view of argumentation cannot make sense of the notion of virtuous 
argumentation insofar as a linguistic approach is not designed to handle evaluative 
issues.  
Other approaches that were inspiring to me, and which may highlight the 
preference for a strategic and somewhat cynical interpretation of French "argument 
vertueux", are tied up with the Aristotelian rhetorical tradition (see for instance 
Amossy, 2009, 2012; Declercq, 1992). They consider argumentation as a social 
activity that can be investigated only in connection to a specific context 
characterized by specific stakes, animated by actors pursuing goals and using 
various means, among which, verbal means, to achieve these goals. In such a 
perspective, the issue of the virtues of argumentation is seen through strategic 
glasses: an argument which displays respect for some principles or values is seen 
less as reflecting the arguers’ sincere concern with producing a virtuous argument 
than as a means to enhance the persuasive potential of one’s discourse through 
producing an ethos of bona fide that is favorable to the speaker. 
This opposition between essentially normative English-speaking approaches 
to argumentation, and essentially descriptive French-speaking ones, is not as clear-
cut as the previous presentation suggests. Some French scholars adopt a normative 
stance on argumentation (see for instance Dufour, 2008, Breton, 1996); conversely, 
a growing number of English-speaking scholars pay a sustained attention to the 
discursive and interactional dimension of argumentation; I think of course of Jacobs 
and Jackson’s seminal work on face-to-face argumentation (Jackson & Jacobs, 1980, 
Jacobs, 1987), but also of the Pragma-dialectic model, some of the recent 
developments of which focus on the practice of argumentation (see for instance 
Eemeren & Houtlosser (Eds.), 2005). Nevertheless, these approaches to 
argumentation, while showing an important descriptive and analytical concern, 
simultaneously advocate a normative and prescriptive stance which is largely 
absent from the French-speaking trend I am referring to.13 
 
4. A DESCRIPTIVE APPROACH TO ARGUMENTATIVE NORMS 
 
In brief, maybe as a consequence of this double linguistic and rhetorical background, 
normative approaches to argumentation, that is, approaches aiming at proposing 
criteria for the assessment of argumentation, do not prevail in the francophone 
research on argumentation, which may be characterized, as I suggested before, as 
mainly descriptive (Amossy, 2009, p. 254). However, adopting a descriptive 
                                                 
13 It is well known as for the Pragma-dialectic model; it is also true for Jacobs and Jackson, who 
advocate a normative pragmatics (see Jacobs & Jackson, 2000). It still holds for Gilbert’s theory of 
“coalescent argumentation”; after emphasizing the need for a solid descriptive component of any 
argumentation theory, Gilbert adds: “the elimination of violence as a response to disagreement is, 




perspective on argumentation clearly does not entail that one has no concern for 
argumentative norms. As Sally Jackson puts it, "A descriptive model pictures 
argumentation as it occurs, not necessarily as it ought to occur. But it is important to 
realize that a major part of any description will be a reconstruction of people’s own 
normative ideas. That is, in order to adequately describe argumentative practice, we 
must realize that people already have ideas about whether and how they are obliged 
to defend their statements. " (1989, p. 113) 
The point made by Sally Jackson, and also advocated by Robert Craig (1996), 
Goodwin (2001) or Goldman (1994), meets some concerns expressed in France by 
Christian Plantin.14 Since his early writings, Christian Plantin has been emphasizing 
the need for exploring the spontaneous theories ordinary arguers rely on when 
taking part in argumentative exchanges (Plantin, 1996, p. 16). A quick look on 
argumentative practice makes it obvious that such spontaneous theories have a 
normative component which helps the arguers to elaborate their case and to 
evaluate their opponent’s argument according to some standards. The standards for 
a "good" argument are more likely to be made explicit in agonistic contexts. In 
peaceful interactions, where argumentation fulfills a heuristic, inquiry-like function, 
the norms on which it rests often remain unstated. 
As far as I am concerned, I am particularly interested in the issue of this 
normative dimension of everyday argumentative competence. Most of my research 
consists in exploring the critical activity led by speakers engaged in argumentative 
exchanges. Such a perspective on argumentation defines a research program which 
should address questions such as:  
 
 When people dismiss the opponent’s argument as unacceptable, what norms 
or principles do they resort to?  
 What is the degree of generality of such norms or principles? Do they vary 
according to the domain of knowledge the issue under discussion falls in? Are 
they specific to a discursive genre (academic writings, political meetings, 
conjugal arguments?) Are they typical of a cultural area or of a period in 
history?  
 Is the invocation of argumentative norms always subordinated to local 
strategic objectives (a norm is invoked because it enables one to dismiss the 
opponent’s argument which supports a conclusion the arguer disagrees 
with)? Or does it sometimes reflect the ideal arguers should conform to, 
whatever their momentary rhetorical interest? 
 To what extent does taking these argumentative norms into account improve 
the comprehension of the interactional dynamics of argumentative 
exchanges? For instance, how do the critical questions associated with a 
specific argument scheme structure the interactional sequence opened with 
that kind of argument? 
                                                 
14 Note that Jackson as well as Craig, Goodwin or Goldman, through this attention paid to 
argumentative practice and to its normative dimension, aim at contributing to its improvement; it is 
not centrally the case for Plantin, nor, to my knowledge, for most of French-speaking description-




 A last set of issues defined by a descriptive program dealing with 
argumentative norms has to do with their linguistic expression: how are such 
norms phrased? How are "good" or "bad" arguments qualified? How are they 
named? How are they defined? 
 
These questions outline some of the possible orientations of an anthropological 
approach to argumentative norms that pays attention to the linguistic phrasing of 
arguments as well as to their interactional dynamics.  
Until now, I explored this issue of ordinary argumentative norms along two 
ways.  
 
5. ARGUMENT SCHEMES’ PHRASING AND CRITICS 
 
One way consists in analyzing how a specific argument scheme is used, phrased and 
criticized in a specific debate. The notion of critical questions as defined for instance 
by Douglas Walton (Walton & Godden, 2005) or by the pragma-dialectic theory 
(Garssen, 2002) helps the analyst to identify and classify the refuting moves that 
may arise in relation to the use of a specific argument scheme. In return, the 
observation of the refuting moves addressing this argument scheme in a specific 
context may reveal local critical questions conditioning the acceptability of this 
argument scheme (Doury, 1999a, 2005, 2006, 2009a).  
For instance, I explored the way arguments from testimony run in many TV 
debates on pseudo-sciences (like astrology, parapsychology, etc.; Doury, 1999b). 
Apart from the usual critical questions addressed to check the reliability of any 
testimony (Govier, 2001, pp. 145-147), the transcripts of TV debates on the subject 
show that the fact that the witness looks like a nice guy, as well as the fact that he is 
a run-of-the-mill person, with a run-of-the-mill life, are stated as arguments inviting 
to trust a testimony. 
The "nice face" criterion may be used by the host of a TV show as in the 




Patrick Poivre D’Arvor: alors, vous y croyez, vous y croyez pas, ça 
dépend, c'est vrai qu'ils ont une bonne tête.15 
Patrick Poivre D’Arvor: believe them or not, at any rate they have a 
nice face 
 
Whatever its assessment with regard to rationality standards, I hold "at any rate 
they have a nice face" to be an argument oriented to the "believe them" branch of 
the conjunction ("believe them or not"); such an analysis permits to account for the 
textual coherence of the sequence. Besides, whereas such an argument would 
probably be deemed bluntly fallacious by most of the normative analysts, it is not 
                                                 




deprived of all psychological relevance: there is no serious doubt that the physical 
appearance of someone always influences to some extent the way the message he 
delivers will be perceived. It is all the more the case for arguments from testimony, 
which make the perception of the witness central to the acceptance of the claim. 
This criterion gains even more weight in the context of a TV broadcast, known to 
give a crucial importance to image issues.  
The ‘out-of-the-mill’ argument is more specifically linked with what is being 
testified for: testimonies about extraordinary events or facts seem to be deemed all 
the more credible that they are reported by banal, ordinary witnesses. It may 
explain why the host of the TV broadcast, when introducing the couple who 
underwent an out-of-body experience, insists on the fact that until then, they had 
ordinary people’s life: 
 
Example (3)  
Patrick Poivre D’Arvor: Alors il est évident que quand on fait ce genre 
d'émission on essaye d'éviter les farfelus alors on a fait une petite 
enquête de voisinage pour savoir si les gens qu'on recevait étaient 
quand même convenables bon ceux-là ils le sont c'est ce qu'on nous dit 
chez vous et effectivement quand on vous lit on s'aperçoit que vous avez 
l'existence de monsieur tout le monde et de madame tout le monde 
jusqu'au jour où vous étudiant à Lille dans votre chambre vous 
pratiquez pour la première fois sans savoir de quoi il s'agissait un 
dédoublement astral.16 
Patrick Poivre D’Arvor: Well obviously when one prepares this kind of 
program one tries to avoid eccentrics so we conducted a little inquiry 
in their neighborhood in order to make sure that the people we 
invited were at least respectable, well, those two are, that’s what 
we’ve been told by your neighbours and in fact when one reads your 
book, one realizes that you have an out-of-the-mill way of life until the 
day when, while you were a student in Lille, in your room, you 
experience for the first time, without having ever heard of that, an 
astral split.  
 
The ordinariness of witnesses is a recurring motive of arguments from testimony 
concerning UFO apparitions, communication with the dead experiences and other 
improbable matters of that kind; this motive is meant to increase the acceptability of 
the testimonies under discussion. 
This quick evocation of the way argument from testimony works in the 
context of the debate on pseudo-sciences is meant to illustrate the fact that a close 
attention paid to argumentation in various communication contexts, and 
specifically, attention paid to the way objections elicited by a specific argumentative 
scheme may be anticipated or answered, enables the analyst to identify which 
critical questions are intrinsically attached to this argument scheme "in the 
                                                 




abstract", and which are context-dependent. 
 
6. THE LEXICON OF THE ORDINARY CRITICS OF ARGUMENTATION 
 
The second main research orientation I have been exploring concerning ordinary 
argumentative critical practice is more linguistic-oriented. It focuses on the very 
words used by ordinary speakers to name and qualify argumentative phenomena. In 
this sense, it parallels the research conducted for instance by Robert Craig (1999) 
on what he calls "practical metadiscourse", and more specifically the exploration of 
the "ordinary" use of words such as "argument", "argue" or "issue" by Robert Craig 
(2011), Karen Tracy (Craig & Tracy, 2005), or Jean Goodwin (2007).  
Such a focus on the ordinary meta-language of argumentation connects with 
the question of argumentative norms in that it appears that most of the meta-
argumentative terms used by ordinary speakers have a normative dimension. It 
seems that speakers engaged in an argumentative discussion rarely talk about 
argumentation in general, or about specific argumentative processes, in a neutral 
way. Thus, argumentative daily practice suggests that categorizing an argument as 
displaying a specific argument scheme is usually nothing but a preamble to its 
assessment – or even concomitant with it.  
The exploration of argumentation meta-language is interesting in that it 
provides an access to ordinary, spontaneous, practical, proto-, or whatever one calls 
them, theories of argumentation.  
My point is not to claim that spontaneous theories for argumentation would 
be "better", more "true", more "accurate" than academic theories of argumentation. 
It is rather that, beyond its anthropological interest, a good knowledge of ordinary 
views of argumentation (including ordinary argumentative standards), combined 
with a rigorous and systematic model of argumentation, might help one to gain in 
accuracy when analyzing arguments.  
Besides, the idea that there would be something like an ordinary theory of 
argumentation, notably showing through ordinary meta-language of argumentation, 
is a fiction, for at least two reasons.  
First, as suggested by Craig (1996, p. 465), it would be wiser to speak of 
sketches of theories, partial theories or even only of theoretical fragments: there is 
no reason why arguers should elaborate on a systematic, complete, explicit theory of 
argumentation. Much more probably do they resort to the theoretical modules that 
serve their local argumentative purposes. 
Second, there is no reason why this ordinary theoretical substratum should 
be unified: as an element of the argumentative competence, it is plausibly 
heterogeneous, and varies from one cultural sphere to another, from one 
communication context or discursive genre to another, and even from one person to 
another.  
To illustrate this point, consider the following dialogue, which is too beautiful 
to be true; I borrowed it from the Simpson’s cartoon. The episode is entitled "Homer 
vs. Lisa and the 8th Commandment". In the episode, Homer gets an illegal cable 
hook-up. His daughter Lisa radically disapproves of that: for her, it amounts to 




argumentation in order to convince Lisa that if she considers using an illicit cable is 
stealing, then she herself can be said to steal things on many occasions. The 
argument runs as follows: 
 
Example (4) 
Lisa: Dad, why is the world such a cesspool of corruption? 
Homer: [sotto voce] Oh, great... [speaking up] All right, what makes 
you say that? 
Lisa: Well, in Sunday School, we learned that stealing is a sin. 
Homer: Well, DUH. 
Lisa: But everybody does it. I mean, we're stealing cable as we speak. 
Homer: Oh. Look at it this way, when you had breakfast this morning, 
did you pay for it? 
Lisa: No. 
Homer: And did you pay for those clothes you're wearing? 
Lisa: No, I didn't. 
Homer: Well, run for the hills, Ma Barker! Before I call the Feds! 
Lisa: Dad, I think that's pretty spurious. 
Homer [looking flattered]: Well, thank you, honey. 
 
The comical effect of this sequence is due to a double discrepancy between Homer’s 
and Lisa’s communicative competences.  
The first one has to do with an unequal distribution of lexical competence. 
Clearly, ‘spurious’ does not enter Homer’s vocabulary – which may be deemed 
somewhat rudimentary, whereas his daughter Lisa is an educated and very smart 
person. Specifically, Homer’s "thank you, honey" signs the fact that he takes 
"spurious" to be a positive assessing word. Note that the interpretation of Homer’s 
"thank you" as being ironic is reasonably excluded by non-verbal indications: 
Homer’s tone of voice is cheerful, and his face shows a high rate of self-satisfaction. 
Although probably hearing the word spurious for the first time, he is 
interpreting it as positively oriented in this specific context, and this has to do with a 
second type of discrepancy, which concerns argumentative standards. Homer seems 
to be very satisfied with the argument he has just put forward in order to discourage 
Lisa’s virtuous drives, and he expects his daughter to echo his self-satisfaction: 
hence he tends to interpret the word "spurious", which he does not know, as 
laudatory. In contrast, the critical inquiry to which Lisa has submitted her father’s 
argument concludes to a negative assessment of it ("Dad, I thing that’s pretty 
spurious").  
This example is quite typical of ordinary critics of argumentation, in that the 
criterion according to which Homer’s argument has been negatively assessed 
remains unstated. Maybe Lisa has categorized her father’s strategy as a tu quoque ad 
hominem argument. Homer charges her with having committed the same crime as 
the one she accuses him of; and she considers that the fact of charging her back with 
theft is irrelevant to the question under discussion (should they renounce using the 
illegal cable?). Maybe Lisa’s reluctance to accept her father’s line of argument is due 




something you have not paid for", whereas Lisa might well consider that such a 
definition is incorrect, for it would lead to qualify faultless behaviors as "thefts": 
nothing, in the dialogue, tells us which line of assessment corresponds to Lisa’s 
reasoning. 
Second, the critical activity displayed by Lisa is typical of daily arguments in 
that it cannot be isolated from strategic concerns. Lisa does not assess her father’s 
argument from an exterior, neutral, disinterested perspective. She assesses it from 
her locally involved perspective, in connection with her rhetorical objective, namely, 
resisting her father’s attempt at benumbing her guilt feelings, and even convincing 
him of not using the illicit cable. In this example, as it is the case most of the time, 
argumentative criticism occurs because it serves refuting achievements. This 
remark does not reflect a cynical perception of the use of argumentative norms in 
ordinary discourse: Lisa might well be sincere and readily adhere to the standards 
she invokes – and she even surely does (Lisa is a deeply virtuous person). My point 
is only that in "real-life" examples, the critical assessment of argumentation must be 
considered in the light of the participant’s rhetorical local objectives. 
 
7. QUALIFYING ARGUMENTS 
 
The research direction suggested by the Simpson example is certainly worth 
pursuing. Identifying and analyzing the various evaluative adjectives, like "spurious" 
in the dialogue, that may be attached to the word "argument" or "argumentation" is 
a way of accessing ordinary argumentative norms.17  
A quick survey in googlegroups discussion forums suggests that an argument 
may be assessed in quite general terms. Typically, it may be deemed "good" or 
"bad". The principles of assessment underlying some of the evaluative adjectives 
associated with "argument" may echo standard evaluation criteria of argument. 
Hence an argument may be deemed relevant or irrelevant, rational or irrational, 
reasonable or unreasonable (and sometimes, "reasonably rational"), logical or 
illogical, coherent or incoherent. After noting this superficial lexical convergence, 
one should of course check to what extent these oppositions, which go through daily 
argumentative discourses, conform to the way they are conceived of by 
argumentation scholars. 
Another way of assessing arguments in ordinary discourses focuses on the 
effect it may have on the audience. When an argument is deemed "persuasive" or 
"convincing", "strong", "acceptable", "seductive", the evaluation standard seems to 
be the argument’s efficiency, its ability for making the audience adhere to the thesis 
that it supports.  
When the argument is said to be "civil", "fair", "honest", or "virtuous", the evaluation 
rather rests on something like an ethics of communication.  
Some qualifications of "argument" are much more unexpected. It is the case 
                                                 
17 Goodwin’s 2007 paper (“What, in practice, is an argument?”) develops a quantitative approach to 
the discursive context in which the word “argument” appears, and specifically, to the adjectives that 





for instance for "boring": "your argument is boring", writes "God incorporated" in 
alt.atheism. "Boring" clearly carries a negative viewpoint on the argument. It may 
reflect a hedonist perspective on communication in general, and on argumentation 
in particular: an argument should be phrased in such a way as to elicit the 
audience’s interest and to provide it with pleasure. "Boring" may also refer to the 
lack of novelty of the argument: an argument is boring when it is neither interesting 
nor exciting because it is already known or heard or read. In both interpretations, a 
boring argument violates the efficiency criterion: in order to be persuasive, one 
must prevent the argument he carries from being boring.  
A last example of how the evaluative adjectives associated with "argument" 
suggest that ordinary critics of argumentation does not always follow the lines of 
normative academic theories of argumentation, is the rich paradigm that opposes 
"clever, smart, subtle" arguments to "dumb, silly, stupid" ones. No doubt that this 
assessment paradigm is quite common; no doubt either that it illustrates an original 
way of evaluating arguments with regard to usual academic normative perspectives 
on argumentation. It also is certain that making this criterion systematic and 
rigorous enough to make judgments such as "this argument is a smart one" or "this 
argument is fricking retarded"18 intersubjectively decidable is a failure-destined 
endeavor. 
 
8. CATEGORIZING ARGUMENTS 
 
The researches that I’ve been conducting on ordinary argumentative norms, when 
centered on lexical indicators, have been centered on nouns rather than on 
adjectives. They are based on the fact that, when interpreting the arguments they 
are confronted to, ordinary speakers do no stick to their literal, local meaning, but 
relate them to more general categories on the basis of the underlying abstract 
pattern they have identified. Such general categories connect more or less directly 
with classically identified argument schemes. Garssen’s 2002 paper entitled 
"Understanding argument schemes" presents the results of experimental studies 
that have proved the cognitive reality of such an ordinary argumentative 
categorizing competence; he also shows that the distinction between the three main 
families of argument –comparative, symptomatic, causal arguments – echo by and 
large arguers’ categorizing and qualifying competence. 
Garssen considers that an arguer has correctly identified the scheme an 
argument belongs to when the strategies he uses to object to it fit the critical 
questions associated with this scheme by a theoretical model – here, Pragma-
Dialectics. Another complementary way of exploring the connection between 
spontaneous categorizations of arguments and academic or scholarly ones, requires 
once more that one pays attention to argumentation meta-language. What are the 
terms that ordinary arguers use to name the arguments they carry, or the 
arguments they are confronted with? Do these terms also belong to scholarly 
terminology of argumentation studies? Are they defined the same way? Is their 





assessment the same? 
The terms used to categorize an argument may, or may not, have an evaluative 
dimension. For instance, an "example" or an "analogy" may be deemed "good" or 
"poor"; therefore the use of the terms "example" or "analogy" to designate an 
argument may be deemed neutral when not qualified. By contrast, certain terms 
always convey a negative perspective on the argument they refer to: it is the case for 
French word "amalgame", which refers to an argument based on a parallel between 
two situations, persons or entities, on the basis of a connection which may be a 
causal relationship, or a resemblance, or an inductive move from the particular to 
the general. Whatever relationship it establishes, an "amalgame" is always deemed 
"fallacious": the phrase "a good amalgame" is self-contradictory (Doury, 2005). 
Other words are much more ambiguous as regards the evaluative perspective 




‘Pretext’ is clearly a term belonging to the ordinary meta-language of 
argumentation. A pretext is a justification one advances as a reason motivating an 
action. A pretext may be put forward before the action has taken place; it then aims 
at influencing the decision. It may also be put forward a posteriori; it then aims at 
making the past decision appear legitimate. 
The arguer who is said to be using a pretext for an action is portrayed as 
carrying a means-end argumentation – an argumentation which obeys the following 
pattern:  
 
Measure M is designed to achieve end E. 
End E is desirable 
So,  
Measure M must be adopted.  
 
But the story does not end here: beyond this neutral semantic core, "pretext" also 
often carries a judgment on the reason it designates. This judgment does not 
concern the truth of the propositional content of the "pretext": the categorization of 
an argument as a pretext does not mean that Premise 1 or 2 are being challenged, 
nor does it mean that they do not support the conclusion. Categorizing an argument 
as a "pretext" has to do with the sincerity issue: the problem lies within the fact that, 
in the eyes of the speaker who calls an argument a "pretext", the arguer using the 
so-called "pretext" does not pursue the achievement of end E, but rather that of 
another end he wants to keep secret. Categorizing an argument as a pretext 
amounts to view the situation as implying an internal reasoning determined by a 
hidden agenda, and an externalized argumentation obeying a different end-means 





Externalized argumentation   Internal reasoning   
 
1. Measure M is a means to achieve end E. 1. Measure M is a means to achieve 
end E’. 
2. End E is desirable     2. End E’ is desirable 
So,        So,  




The meaning of "pretext" does not imply that the arguer’s real intentions are 
shameful. Consider that I used the fact that my computer was out of order and that I 
needed someone to fix it, in order to draw John in my apartment while his friends 
were preparing a surprise birthday party in his own apartment. My displayed 
intention is to have my computer fixed; my hidden agenda is to have John out of his 
home; the beneficiary of the deception is John himself. In this specific case, it is 
highly plausible that no negative judgment will be attached to the use of the word 
"pretext", even if I was insincere when evoking my broken computer as my motive. 
Only a rigid moralist would deem such a pretext reprehensible, because of the 
dissimulation any pretext, by definition, entails. 
However, in most of the cases, naming the reason given by an arguer "a 
pretext" conveys a negative judgment, and appears in denunciatory discourses. This 
negative judgment is shown by the semantic value of the phrase "a false pretext", 
which can be met in the following examples: 
 
Example (5) 
Nuclear bombs are a false pretext for setting up the American public 
to support a future war with Iran.19 
 
Example (6) 
The two girls know very well that this is a false pretext to lure them 
into a "male trap".20 
 
Example (7) 
Moscow uses false pretext to wreck Georgia.21 
 
Whereas a false friend is not a friend – and is even probably closer to an enemy, a 
false pretext is not a good reason, but is a hyperbolic pretext. The adjunction of 
"false" to ‘pretext’ emphasizes the dissimulation proper to it, and therefore clearly 
orients to a negative assessment of the device. 








The negative judgment attached to the use of "pretexts" seems to be elicited 
by the contrast between the displayed reason, and the end which is really aimed at. 
The displayed reason is meant to appeal consensus. This is why it often plays on the 
addressee’s dearest values or feelings: when you portray a rapist has having evoked 
a consuming thirst as a pretext in order to pity his victim into letting him in, you 
suggest he took advantage of his victim’s kind heartedness.  
When you suggest that the United States government used the 11th of 
September as a pretext to restrain individual civil liberties and to increase his power 
over American people,22 you accuse it of having deliberately exploited a traumatic 
event associated with pain and fear in order to gain consensus on a liberticidal 
measure.  
In these examples, which I deem typical, the invocation of arguments as 
externalized reasons for justifying an action is all the more open to criticism that 
they exploit the audience’s feelings and values to serve one’s immoral ends. 
What seems interesting to me is that, even if one considers that the 
externalized argumentation is conclusive, the suspicion that the arguer has a hidden 
agenda clearly downgrades the acceptability of the conclusion, whereas the 
existence of a hidden agenda does not make the public means-end argument less 
acceptable from a logical point of view. In such a case, ethical requirements clearly 
overrule other assessment standards. 
The use of the word "pretext" in argumentative ordinary meta-discourse 
should be further investigated. In particular, the use of the phrase "a good pretext" 
should be scrutinized; to what extent is a "good pretext" still a pretext at all? Is it an 
efficient pretext, that is, a pretext that is plausible enough to deceive the addressee? 
Or is it, on the contrary, a poorly deceptive pretext – that is, almost a reason? 
Besides, the "pretext/excuse" pair should be examined. In this respect, a contrastive 
approach would probably reveal interesting: both words "pretext" and "excuse" 
exist in French ("prétexte" and "excuse"); but, at first sight, they don’t seem to have 
the same distribution. 
 
8.2 Linguistic resources  
 
The last point of this paper concerns the interest of a focus on the linguistic 
resources that a particular language offers to the speakers in order to label and 
evaluate the arguments they use as well as the arguments they are confronted to. 
When I initiated this part of my research, I investigated two French words 
very common in argumentative discussions, and used by francophone speakers to 
disqualify the opponent’s argument as being fallacious. The first one, that I have 
already mentioned, is the term "amalgame". The second one is the term "procès 
d’intention" (Doury, 2009b). My research was originally conducted in French, and 
on French data; and I was very surprised when it became clear that, in both cases, 
the translation into English was problematic indeed. Of course, it is possible to 
explain what the argumentative moves designated by these terms consist of. As I 





suggested before, an "amalgame" may be described as a faulty parallel between two 
situations, persons or entities, on the basis of a connection of various nature. A 
"procès d’intention" may be described as the illegitimate rejection of the claim 
supported by someone on the basis of the shameful motives which, supposedly, 
founded the arguer in advancing it. Nevertheless, I consider as non trivial the fact 
that a given language provides its practitioners with terms referring to some 
specific argumentative moves – but not to others, and that it reflects a specific 
attitude towards those moves. Intuitively – but no doubts this requires a more 
serious reflection – I would say that it both reflects and encourages an increased 
sensitivity to specific argumentative patterns, which may not fit exactly the expert 
classical divisions into argument schemes. 
Nevertheless, the perception, by the arguers, of a claim as belonging to a 
recognizable argumentative scheme does not seem to depend on the existence, in 
the arguers’ language, of an expression to name it – and I will close my paper with 
the evocation of what arguers sometimes do when their own language does not 
provide them with satisfactory terms to label the arguments they are confronted 
with.  
As it has been claimed by Eemeren & Meuffels (2002), the arguments that are 
rejected as unacceptable by the arguers in everyday polemical interactions are often 
of the ad hominem type. In France, the expression "ad hominem argument" is almost 
never used to label such an argumentative device in daily discussions.23 Speakers 
rather often resort to extended periphrases such as "you should discuss the facts, 
and not criticize the persons. " They may also create original terminologies in order 
to categorize argumentative schemes (Doury, 2006), as in Example 8. In a highly 
polemical internet newsgroup, a participant accuses "Apokrif" of pretending to be 
modest whereas he previously charged others of displaying such a false modesty. 
Apokrif answers as follows: 
 
Example (8) 
Vous avez acheté un stock de céçuikidikiyé au prix de gros? 
Did you buy a stock of "céçuikidikiyé" ["you are what you say I am"/ "I 
know you are, but what am I?"] at wholesale price? 
 
Apokrif accuses his opponent of constantly using an argument scheme that he labels 
a "céçuikidikiyé"; "céçuikidikiyé" is a neologism issued from the oral form of the 
juvenile expression "I know you are, but who am I?" (literally, "you are what you say 
I am" [c’est celui qui dit qui est] "). It refers to a move that consists in reversing the 
abusive designation one is addressed against the one who used it.24 Such a 
designation disqualifies the opponent’s argumentation as childish; in that, it conveys 
an additional criticism that the standard tu quoque designation would have missed. 
Later on in the same newsgroup, another participant charges Apokrif with 
                                                 
23 The situation seems to be somewhat different in a North-American context, probably because 
young American or Canadian people are much more familiarized with terms issued from critical 
thinking throughout their educational training at school or at university. 




himself committing this faulty move. The accusation runs as follows: 
 
Example (9) 
hum… si le CTQDCTQÉ (ou le CPMCT, au choix) était une voiture, vous 
seriez une Ferrari. 
Hum… would the YATOWSYATOWI (or the ITSNMITSY, as you prefer) 
were a car, you would be a Ferrari 
 
After a dense reflection, and given what I knew of former exchanges, I hypothesized 
that those acronyms should be understood as referring to French "C’est Toi Qui Dis 
C’est Toi Qui Es" or English "You Are The One Who Says You Are The One Who Is" 






These beautiful examples of ordinary arguers’ creativity applied to practical 
evaluation of argumentation suggest that the argumentative norms that underlie 
ordinary arguments deserve a sustained attention from scholars in argumentation. 
One should pay attention to the content of such norms, to the way they are phrased 
as well as to the way they are used in order to achieve local interactional and 
communicative objectives. Last, a contrastive approach to argumentative norms, 
aiming at exploring the linguistic specificities of the meta-argumentative lexicon in 
various languages, seems to be a promising research orientation for a descriptive 
approach to argumentative norms – or for an amoral analyst interested in the 
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